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   There is a tradition perhaps as old as philosophy itself which sees the rationality of man – and in particular, the rationality of the philosopher - as both his essential and his redeeming characteristic; it can not unfairly be said that the discipline of philosophy at least is characterised by its dependence on reason. In this context, the philosophy of David Hume presents something of a stark challenge:  Although interpretations vary as to the extent and nature of his scepticism, one of the themes of his work is the limits and imperfections of human reason and the sceptical concerns this engenders. On Hume's system, reason is not the overlord of the imagination but at least in part subordinate to it, and can discover little or nothing without recourse to experience.





  There is a tradition perhaps as old as philosophy itself which sees the rationality of man – and in particular, the rationality of the philosopher - as both his essential and his redeeming characteristic. The dividing line between Hesiod and the earliest Presocratic philosophers is drawn by the latter's use of argument, rather than speculation or poetic license, to explain the origins and fundamental principles of nature (Guthrie, 1962, p.29). For Aristotle, man was defined as a rational animal, for whom the most excellent life consisted in the exercise of theoretical reason (1998, p.263); Plato's tripartite theory of soul meanwhile saw the faculty of reason as given rightful dominion over its subordinates in a properly tuned mind (1993, p.153). Descartes, from the comfort of his armchair, believed himself capable of establishing the existence of God and reality and nature of the external world by the exercise of pure reason alone (1998). More generally, it can not unfairly be said that the discipline of philosophy at least is characterised by its dependence on reason; philosophers in greater or lesser part seek to establish truths by weighing up arguments and analysing concepts.





  The ambition of David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature can be seen in its subtitle: “Being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects”. In the eighteenth century, there were two branches to philosophy: natural philosophy, that is, what we now think of as the physical and natural sciences; and moral philosophy, whose domain was humans or human behaviour, and which included not only what we now think of as philosophical disciplines such as epistemology, metaphysics and ethics, but also subjects such as psychology, politics, sociology, and economics ('moral' in this sense simply means 'pertaining to humans', rather than the more narrow, ethical sense in which it is usually employed today). The natural sciences had made great strides through the application of what, by Hume's day, had come to be known as the experimental method; natural philosophers seeking to discover things about nature through observation and testing, rather than mere theorizing. Impressed by the success of natural philosophers such as Newton and Boyle in applying this model to make new discoveries about nature, Hume looked to apply an analogous method to moral philosophy with the hopes of similarly advancing our knowledge of humanity. By seeking to use observation, experience and experiment as his tools, rather than simply hypothesising and theorising, he hoped to reinvigorate moral philosophy, a subject Hume considered in such a state of disrepair that

 even the rabble without doors may judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiply'd, as if everything was uncertain; and these disputes are manag'd with the greatest warmth, as if everything was certain (Treatise Introduction 2, p.3).

  In particular, Hume thought that before progress could be made in any given subject, be it ethics or economics, we first had to examine human nature itself, since it is the “science of man” on which all the other sciences, to greater or lesser extent, depend;  hence, we must begin by becoming “thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding”, seeking to “explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings” (Treatise Introduction 4, p.4). Only when we understand the workings of the mind, and its limits will we know what we can hope to understand about other subjects. And, as in the natural sciences, the “only solid foundation” for this investigation of human understanding “must be laid on experience and observation” (Treatise Introduction 7, p.4).

  This is bold stuff, infused with the optimism of the Enlightenment. But, by the end of the first book of the Treatise, it seems Hume's project has run adrift on the shoals of scepticism, with Hume ready to “reject all belief and reasoning” and unable to look upon any “opinion even as more probable or likely than another” (Treatise 1.4.7.8, p.175), reduced to choosing “betwixt a false reason and none at all” (Treatise 1.4.7.7, p.174). Or, at least, this is how Hume's initial readers characterised him; Hume the arch-sceptic, whose philosophy was entirely negative in character. Meeker captures the point well when he writes that James Beattie, Thomas Reid and other early critics saw Hume as showing “how embarking on the ship of empiricism constructed by Locke and Berkeley inevitably navigates one into the storm of destructive scepticism” (2013, p.2). However, despite the dramatic flourishes of the conclusion to book 1 of the Treatise, this interpretation is fundamentally mistaken, and misunderstands the scope and nature of Hume's scepticism. If Hume really did believe any opinion as probable as any other and all reasoning false, then it is strange to say the least that he should have nonetheless thought it worthwhile to persevere with his project and offer, in books 2 and 3 of the Treatise, a wide-ranging account of the passions and morality, an edifice he would be building on sand were the Read-Beattie interpretation correct. 





  Hume often uses the term 'reason' as the name for what  he also calls 'the understanding' or “our reasoning faculty” (Treatise Introduction 5, p.4). Hume conceives of  reason's function being the comparison of ideas: “[a]ll kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a comparison, and a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other” (Treatise 1.3.2.2, p.52). Hume explicitly rejects the earlier Scholastic conception of reason, which, he says, divided “the acts of the understanding into conception, judgement and reasoning”, with conception being “the simple survey of one or more ideas”, judgement “the separating or uniting of different ideas” and reasoning “the separating or uniting of different ideas by the interposition of others, which show the relation they bear to each other” (Treatise 1.3.7. n20, p.67). For Hume, all three acts of the mind reduce to the first, conception, the “simple survey of one or more ideas” and the relations that hold between them. This is because, firstly, he argues, that some judgements involve just a single idea, for instance the proposition 'God is'; and secondly, that we can “exert our reason without employing more than two ideas, and without having a recourse to a third to serve as a medium betwixt them” (loc cit). So the tripartite division of the understanding's activities is simply unnecessary, and (perhaps not entirely plausibly) Hume believes “the act of the mind exceeds not a simple conception” (loc cit).

 Now, in Lockean fashion, Hume divides the activities of the understanding into two kinds: demonstrative reasoning and probable reasoning. In the Treatise, this dichotomy is characterised in terms of the difference between the two classes of  “seven philosophical relations” (1.1.5.2, p.15) that Hume believes capable of holding between ideas when compared by the mind. The first class consists of those relations “that depend entirely on ideas, which we compare together” (1.3.1.1, p.50), namely, the relations of resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity and number. The second class consists of those relations that can be changed “without any change on the objects themselves or on their ideas” (loc cit), namely, the relations of identity, causation, and location in time and space. Here, Hume is distinguishing between those objects of understanding which depend solely on the ideas the mind is comparing and those which require further empirical input. The former class of relations is the only one that can yield “objects of knowledge and certainty” (Treatise 1.3.1.2,p.50); reasoning involving the comparison of ideas via these relations is what constitutes demonstrative reasoning (in fact, more specifically, it is the relation of proportions in quantity and number which is the subject of demonstration, since the other three relations are discoverable immediately via intuition). The comparison of ideas via the second class of relations constitutes probable reasoning, and can only result in belief rather than knowledge, since the certainty that stems from the invariability of the relations between ideas characteristic of the first class is absent. 

  By the Enquiry, the seven philosophical relations have disappeared from view and this distinction has become that between “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact”: demonstrative reasoning, whose product is knowledge, is that concerned with the relations of ideas, which is to say propositions which can be known a priori, just through examination of the ideas themselves; and probable reasoning, whose product is belief, is that concerned with matters of fact, i.e. propositions whose truth depends on how the world actually is. (This distinction is commonly called 'Hume's Fork'). In the Treatise, the paradigm (indeed, only) sciences of demonstrative reasoning were “algebra and arithmetic” (Treatise 1.3.1.5,  p.51); everything else, not only the natural and moral sciences but also sciences such as geometry were assigned to probable reasoning. (By the Enquiry, however, geometry has been admitted to the realm of that which is demonstratively certain (4.1, p.108)). 

  Now, much scholarly blood has been spilled on the different presentations of the epistemological divide in the Treatise and the Enquiry; traditionally, Hume was seen as pre-empting the modern distinction between deductive and inductive reasoning, the attempted taxonomy of the Treatise being an immature first attempt at what he would later refine into the Enquiry's more considered view. On this view, the divide between relations of ideas and matters of fact more or less corresponds to the analytic/synthetic, necessary/contingent and a priori/a posteriori distinctions; and demonstrative reasoning is reasonably glossed as deductive reasoning, and probable reasoning as inductive inference. But some have argued that to read Hume this way is to be guilty of anachronism, and leads to a fundamental misunderstanding of Hume's system (see e.g. Owen (1999) and Russell (2008)). And it is certainly true that the distinction as drawn in the Treatise does not map so neatly onto this divide; so, for instance, degrees in any quality – such as this object's being heavier than that object – is an intuitive relation of the first, certain kind, but is a purely contingent matter. But whilst much work has been done in exploring the distinction as envisaged in the Treatise independently of the Enquiry, it is not clear that the distinction as presented in the Treatise is even capable of doing the work Hume requires of it. He wants to argue from the principle that intuitively or demonstratively certain propositions can contain only constant relations, but as a criterion of what can be known intuitively or demonstratively (henceforth a criterion of demonstrability) this fails. For instance, the proposition 'if A=B and B=C then A=C' is clearly certain in the strong sense, and yet involves the relation of identity, which belongs to the second of Hume's two classes of relations. Indeed, after enumerating the seven relations, Hume actually makes little use of the dichotomy as a criterion of demonstrability, preferring instead the Conceivability Principle: “whatever we conceive is possible, at least in a metaphysical sense: but wherever a demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a contradiction” (Abstract 11). Can we clearly conceive of the negation of a proposition? If no, as in trying to conceive of a triangle without three sides, then we have a case of knowledge. Otherwise, it is a matter of fact and the province of belief. It is this, rather than by appeal to whether the relations involved are of the constant or inconstant kind, which Hume appeals to when seeking to delineate the demonstrable from the merely probable. 

  So, even if the dichotomy as present in the Treatise is significantly different to that of the Enquiry, in this instance I think it is right not to resist the temptation to see the latter work as the more considered – and useful – analysis, that more accurately captures the gist of the distinction Hume is reaching towards. And at any rate, when it comes to Hume's scepticism regarding reason, it makes little difference to the arguments involved exactly how the demonstrative/probable reasoning dichotomy is characterised, and so consequently for my purposes – and simplicity's sake –  I take Hume to be making the distinction between deduction and induction. And it is to to Hume's scepticism regarding reason that I shall now be turning, beginning with his account of probable reasoning; since probable reasoning – or induction – constitutes the bulk of our reasoning, it is reasonable to ask: is such reasoning rationally justified? And Hume's answer, famously, is no.

3. Probable reasoning and the 'problem' of induction

  As we have already seen, for Hume, the category of knowledge is limited to that which is demonstrably certain; the rest of our beliefs concerning matters of fact, which is to say the vast bulk of our beliefs, are merely more or less probable. This means probable reasoning has a very large role to play in Hume's epistemology, and for Hume probable reasoning boils down to reasoning concerning causation. In the Treatise, this is presented as being because, of the three inconstant philosophical relations of identity, situations in time and place, and causation, only the last properly involves reasoning at all. The other two relations are immediately perceived rather than reasoned to:

 “[w]hen both the objects are present to the senses along with the relation, we call this perception rather than reasoning; nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought or any action, properly speaking, but a mere passive admission of the impressions thro' the organs of sensation” (Treatise 1.3.2.2 p.52). 

In none of the observations we make concerning identity or relations of time and place can “the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses” (loc cit); it is only causation that allows us to reason from the observed to the unobserved (so, for instance, from an impression of an object to the idea of an independently-existing object that was the cause of that impression).

  This, it must be said, is not intuitively plausible. Is every relation of identity immediately perceived? The philosophical literature on the subject of personal identity would suggest not. By the Abstract the claim has become, more plausibly, that “all reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on the relation of cause and effect” (Abstract 8 p.409), with Hume's core claim being rescued from its slightly shaky setting in the scheme of the Treatise, and this is how the issue will continue to be framed in the Enquiry. Although some matters of fact can be learnt directly through perception and recalled via memory later, what of the rest? “[W]hat is the nature of that evidence, which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory” (Enquiry 4.1.3, p.108)? The answer is we are able to move beyond the impressions of the senses and memory by means of reasoning from cause and effect.

  So, all probable reasoning – reasoning concerning matters of fact – is based on the relation of cause and effect. But from where is this idea of causation derived? Hume first analyses the relation of cause and effect into three components: for an event to be considered the cause or effect of another, first there must contiguity in space between the cause and the effect, in order that the one might bring about the other (thus ruling out action at a distance); second, the cause must be prior in time to the effect, which is to say there must be succession from the one to the other; causes cannot be simultaneous with their effects. But contiguity and succession alone are not sufficient to constitute a genuine causal relation; there must also be some kind of necessary connection between the two events considered cause and effect. And this necessary connection, Hume concludes, is nothing more than an experience of a constant conjunction between the two; i.e., upon repeatedly finding As contiguous and successive with Bs, we infer that As cause Bs. It is only by experience that we can discover causal relations. We cannot discover such relations a priori, since there is “no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves, and never look beyond the ideas which we form of them” (Treatise 1.3.6.1, p.61).  In the Abstract, Hume illustrates this point with a thought-experiment, and asks us to imagine Adam, “created in the full vigour of understanding” (11, p.410), but without any experience (a similar thought experiment is presented in section 4 of the Enquiry). Were he to encounter a pair of billiard balls, “he would never be able to infer motion in the second ball from the motion and impulse of the first” (loc cit). Without the relevant experience of seeing balls hitting one another, there is no way of his knowing that the motion of one ball will be communicated to the other; reason cannot just see a billiard ball and infer the effects it will have a priori .Here, Hume makes an appeal to the Conceivability Principle: no inference from cause to effect can amount to a demonstration, since we can always clearly conceive any cause to follow from any effect; whatever we can conceive is possible, but “wherever a demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a contradiction” (loc cit).

  So causal reasoning is based on experience, specifically the experience of a constant conjunction of pairs of objects in a regular order of contiguity and succession. (Treatise 1.3.6.2, p.61). But furthermore, “all reasonings from experience are founded on the supposition, that the course of nature will continue uniformly the same” (Abstract 13, p.410). Having experienced the constant conjunction of As and Bs in regular order of contiguity and succession, we extrapolate from the observed to the unobserved and assume that future As we encounter will be followed by Bs in like fashion. This is Hume's famous Uniformity Principle; in the Treatise, it is formulated as “that instances, of which we have had no experience, must resemble those of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature must continues always uniformly the same” (1.3.6.4, p.62). And in the Enquiry, it is stated as follows: “all our experimental [i.e. those concerning matters of fact] conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past” (4.2.19, p.115). The loosening of the principle from the Treatise to its more general formulations in the Abstract and Enquiry is presumably intentional; as presented in the Treatise, the Uniformity Principle is in fact too strong: that instances of which we have had no experience must resemble those of which we have is implausible (this would mean that, if every swan I have thus far seen is white, every swan I might encounter in the future must be white too). But its more general formulation, that the future will be conformable to the past, is more plausible as a supposition involved in our reasoning from the observed to the unobserved. We do assume, more or less, that the future will resemble the past when engaged in probable reasoning (i.e. reasoning concerning matters of fact). 

  The next question Hume asks is: what is the basis of the Uniformity Principle? Does experience produce the idea by means of reason or the understanding, or by means of some other faculty, such as the imagination? Are we “determin'd by reason to make the transition, or by a certain association and relation of perceptions?” (Treatise 1.3.6.4, p.62). Although in the Treatise the only two possible foundations for the Uniformity Principle considered are demonstrative and probable arguments, in the Enquiry Hume first pauses to consider whether the principle can be known directly, either through intuition or the senses. Both are rightly rejected, however; that the principle is not intuitively known is self-evident, and that “there is no known connexion between between the sensible qualities and secret powers”  of objects means “the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by any thing which it knows of their nature” (Enquiry 4.2.16, p.113). 

  So, neither sense-perception nor intuition can serve as a foundation for the Uniformity Principle. What of demonstrative argument, or probable inference? That there can be no demonstrative argument to serve as a foundation for the Uniformity Principle Hume shows by once again making an appeal to the Conceivability Principle: a change in the course of nature is clearly conceivable and therefore possible: “[t]o form a clear idea of any thing, is an undeniable argument for its possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended demonstration against it” (Treatise 1.3.6.5, p.62). So if the Uniformity Principle is to have any rational foundation, it must be by means of a probable argument. But this, too, is impossible. Probable arguments must be based on causal relations, since causation is the only “relation of objects ... on which we can found a just inference from one object to another” (Treatise 1.3.6.7, p.63); but causal inference is “founded on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those, of which, we have had none” (loc cit). So, since probable inference relies on causal relations, it is impossible for there to be a probable argument for the Uniformity Principle; any such argument would presuppose the Uniformity Principle, and so would be viciously circular.

  Having thus found that the Uniformity Principle has no basis in either demonstrative or probable reasoning, Hume is able to conclude that it has no satisfactory foundation in reason at all. And since all probable reasoning presupposes the Uniformity Principle, this means that probable reasoning itself has no foundation in reason at all. 

Reason can never show us the connexion of one object with another, tho' aided by experience, and the observation of their constant conjunction in all past instances. When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not determin'd by reason, but by certain principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination. (Treatise 1.3.6.12, p.64).

Since reason is not responsible for the Uniformity Principle, and therefore probable reasoning (reasoning concerning matters of fact, inductive inference), it must instead be founded in some principle or process of the imagination, which Hume goes on to identify as custom (see e.g. Treatise 1.3.7.6, p.67) or habit (see e.g. Treatise 1.3.10.1, p.81), defining this as the process by which “the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding” (Enquiry 5.1.5, p.121).

  Although this is only the first, negative stage of Hume's argument concerning inductive inference (the positive stage being his account of how it is that custom and habit guide our probable reasoning) it is nonetheless worth pausing here to take stock, since we have discovered the first potential source of Hume's scepticism regarding reason. Hume has demonstrated that all our reasonings concerning matters of fact are not, ultimately, rationally grounded, being instead grounded in associative principles of the imagination rather than the understanding. Traditionally, this has been interpreted as a radically sceptical conclusion, with Hume, the discoverer of what would come to be called the problem of induction, purporting to show that all inductive inference is irrational and unjustified. But to read Hume as attacking induction is deeply unsatisfactory, since, having supposedly reached this conclusion in the first book of the Treatise, he then goes on to (on this reading blindly) engage in all kinds of inductive inferences concerning the passions and morality in the Treatise's remaining two books. As Baier puts it, “if Hume really distrusts causal inference, and the inductions on which, if he is right, it rests, then he must distrust his own Treatise” (1991, p.55). And indeed, upon reaching these conclusions in the third section of the first book of the Treatise, Hume does not present his findings in a sceptical light; although a sceptical crisis shall emerge later, in section four of the first book of the Treatise, Hume presents his conclusion here as part of his account of the operation of probable reasoning, rather than as any kind of epistemic threat. So, if we are not simply to attribute to Hume a gross inconsistency we must understand that his claim that induction is not determined by reason is not the claim that it is irrational or epistemically valueless, since Hume is in fact a keen advocate of inductive science.

  How should we, then, interpret Hume here? What does it mean to say that probable reasoning is not determined by reason? There are a few candidate interpretations. Given that Hume proceeds to offer a naturalistic, psychological account of the operations of inductive inference, one answer might be to suggest that, in describing it as being unjustified by reason, Hume is not making a normative point but a descriptive one: rather than condemning inductive inference and the beliefs it results in, he is describing the psychological mechanisms by which we generate beliefs. This approach is taken by Owen (1999), who rightly points out that if Hume's concern really were the justification or warrant of probable reasoning then his answer of custom or habit would be hopelessly ill-suited to addressing the issue at hand. He goes on to suggest that Hume's account of the psychological mechanisms of induction and the beliefs generated by it instead serves a refutation of a Lockean model of reason; to say that probable reasoning is not determined by reason is to say that it doesn't proceed by a process of stepwise inference via intermediate ideas. For Owen, “the activity of probable reasoning, i.e. the production of beliefs, cannot be explained by traditional theories of reason” (p.138), such theories of reason conceiving it “as functioning by the discovery of intermediate ideas that link the two ideas at the ends of the chain”. However, the problem with this interpretation, as with any that suggests that what Hume is looking to do is discredit a particular conception of reason distinct from his own, is that it creates an ambiguity in Hume's use of the term 'reason': here being used to refer to the model he is looking to discredit, but elsewhere being used to cover Hume's own conception of the faculty of reason. But nowhere in the argument itself does Hume give any indication that he is using 'reason' in a sense different to that which he has been using it throughout the rest of the Treatise; so to read Hume as arguing against a particular conception of reason distinct from his own is a mistake.

  Another interpretation which sees Hume's interests as being with descriptive psychology rather than normative epistemology is that of Garrett (2015), who sees Hume's argument as being “directed  not at establishing a negative normative claim about epistemic value but rather at establishing a causal claim about the operation of causal reasoning” (p.180). Thus, on this reading, Hume's argument is designed to show that the belief in the Uniformity Principle which underpins inductive inference is not itself caused by a further mediating piece of reasoning, but instead by the “intervention of the unreasoning imagination” (ibid. p.179). Hume's interest here is how it is we come to believe in the Uniformity Principle, rather than its justification; so, for instance, at the end of section 4 of the Enquiry, he asserts that even “the most ignorant and stupid peasants, nay infants, nay even brute beasts” engage in probable reasoning on the supposition of the uniformity of nature, despite obviously not being led to do so by “any process of argument or ratiocination”; “it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to appearance, similar” (4.2.23, p.118). The chief advantage of this interpretation over Owen's is that it avoids attributing to Hume an ambiguous notion of 'reason'; here 'reason' is consistently meant as 'the faculty of the understanding', with Hume not slipping between a Humean and non-Humean sense of 'reason' as on, say, Owen's account. 

 Although disagreeing with Garrett (and Owen) as to whether Hume's concern is in descriptive psychology rather than normative epistemology, a nonetheless not too dissimilar interpretation is offered by Millican (2011), who argues that what Hume demonstrates here is that inductive inference is not grounded in cognition; that induction is a “cognitive process which depends on a non-cognitive sub-process” of custom-enlivened ideas (p.86). So, Millican agrees with Garrett that probable reasoning is an operation of reason, and that the challenge is to reconcile this with the claim that it is not determined by reason; and whereas for Garrett this meant that the supposition of the Uniformity Principle was not itself determined by any piece of reasoning, for Millican this means that the process of inductive inference (a process of reason) is determined by a non-cognitive sub-process, this “underlying process [being] of a type which is naturally categorized as 'imaginative' rather than 'rational', because it works through an associative mechanism which automatically and mindlessly extrapolates beyond anything we have perceived or otherwise detected in the world” (loc cit). And although there has been much disagreement between the two as to the details and merits of their respective interpretations, in truth for our purposes it is more useful to note the areas in which they agree, since they are substantial, and contain in outline the most satisfactory way of construing Hume's point: that probable reasoning is a process of the faculty of reason that is determined by or founded on a non-rational process of the imagination. 

  However, this does not answer the sceptical threat but merely postpones it; even if Garrett is right and Hume's concern here is with psychology rather than normative epistemology, the answer he offers to the question of how it is we come to make causal inferences, namely, custom or habit, carries with it epistemological implications that cannot be dodged forever. Hume s endorsement of inductive inference as a legitimate form of reasoning is evident throughout book 3 of the Treatise. But, the question remains to be asked: if our beliefs are not rationally justified, how else are they to be justified? This is an issue which shall return to haunt Hume in the conclusion to the first book of the Treatise, but he postpones this question to first raise a series of sceptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding, and so it is to these we shall now turn.

4. Scepticism with regards to reason

  Having finished his account of demonstrative and probable reasoning in section 3 of book 1 of the Treatise, Hume then goes on to pose a series of sceptical considerations, including, most pertinently for our purposes, a sceptical argument designed to show that, were reason not grounded in associative principles of the imagination, it would subvert itself entirely and leave “not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life” (Treatise 1.4.7.7, p.174). He is thus making the somewhat quixotic strategic move of employing a sceptical argument whose internal conclusion he does not endorse to buttress his positive claim about the crucial role of the imagination in belief-formation.

  The argument is presented in part 4, section 1 of book 1 of the Treatise, and runs as follows: although demonstration follows certain and infallible rules, our faculties are fallible and uncertain, and so we must take this into account in our reasoning. So, in judging the accuracy of any piece of reasoning, we must take into account the probability of our having reasoned correctly. This probability will be less than 1, due to the aforementioned fallibilty of our understanding; even if the chain of reasoning itself is certain and infallible, our ability to judge whether we have reasoned accurately in any given case is merely probable and not certain. It is these doubts about our ability to accurately assess whether our deductive reasonings are correct that lead Hume to claim that “knowledge degenerates into probability” (Treatise 1.4.1.1, p.121). In applying a second-order judgement as to the accuracy of our first-order reasonings, so the argument goes, the certainty of demonstration is replaced by mere probability, and so consequently any claim I might make to know P must become the claim that I believe I know P (since it is only demonstrative reasoning that yields knowledge; probable reasoning yields only belief).  Furthermore, this process is iterative: my ability to judge whether I have reasoned accurately in my claim that I believe I know P is itself only probable, and so a further probability is needed, as to whether I have judged correctly in reviewing my reasoning. This probability, Hume reckons, is the product of the probability of my ability to judge whether I have reasoned accuracy in my claim that I believe I know P and my ability to judge correctly in reviewing my reasoning; since both probabilities are less than 1, the product is smaller than either. Then, the question can be asked, have we judged this operation correctly? Have I judged correctly in my ability to review my reasoning as to whether I have judged whether I have reasoned accurately in my claim that I believe I know that P?  Again, since the probabilities are less than 1, this new probability must be less than both. But then, it can be asked, have we judged this operation correctly? And so on, ad infinitum; this iterative checking process leads any probability of our being justified in any piece of reasonng closer and closer to 0, and thus leads to a “total extinction of belief and evidence” (Treatise 1.4.1.6, p.122). 

  This, however, is a reductio: we do nonetheless retain beliefs, even in the face of a line of reasoning which Hume can find “no error” in; therefore, Hume concludes, belief is not “a simple act of thought” but is instead is “more properly a an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our nature” (Treatise 1.4.1.8, p.123). If belief were a case of choosing to assent or dissent to a given proposition, of making a judgement as to its truth or falsity, in short if belief was the province of reason, then we ought to give up believing anything altogether.  But, we do nonetheless continue to have beliefs, even after being exposed to the sceptical argument described above, and so belief cannot therefore be the province of reason. How is it, then, that the argument Hume can find “no error” in does not nonetheless result in the extinction of belief? The answer is that, since rational mechanisms cannot sustain out beliefs, non-rational mechanisms must do so instead: 

after the first and second decision [as to the probability of our having assessed our reasoning accurately]; as the action of the mind becomes forc'd and unnatural, and the ideas faint and obscure; tho' the principles of judgement, and the ballancing of opposite causes be the same as at the very beginning; yet their influence on the imagination, and the vigour they add to, or diminish from the thought, is by no means equal. Where the mind reaches not its objects with easiness and facility, the same principles have not the same effect as in a more natural conception of the ideas; nor does the imagination feel a sensation, which holds any proportion with that which arises from its common judgements and opinions (Treatise 1.4.1.10, p.124).

As our reasoning becomes more and more strained and abstruse, so its ideas become less and less lively and capable of influencing us, and the line of reasoning which terminates in the extinction of belief is so abstruse that we are incapable of following it all the way through, so to speak. We are saved by a “trivial property of the fancy, by which we enter with difficulty into remote views of things, and are not able to accompany them with so sensible impression, as we do those, which are more easy and natural” (Treatise 1.4.7.7, p.174).

  It must be said that many have not been impressed by the argument of 1.4.1. D.C. Stove described it as “not merely defective, but one of the worst arguments ever to impose itself on a man of genius” (Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism, cited in Ainslie (2015), p.21). Certainly, if Hume is taken to mean that my claim to know a demonstrative truth p is reducible to the point where all I can say is that the probability of p = 0, then it is a bad argument. Demonstrations, being certain, do not have probabilities at all. But this is not Hume's claim: “knowledge and probability are of such contrary and disagreeing natures, that they cannot well run insensibly into each other” (Treatise 1.4.1.3, p.121); it is not that my knowledge that p becomes a belief that p; rather, as already noted,  reflection on my potential for error means my claim to know p becomes embedded in a wider belief claim, namely that I believe that I know p; this is the way in which “knowledge degenerates into probability”. However, that still leaves the second half of the argument, and here Hume overlooks the possibility that in applying further reflexive judgements as to the likelihood of error we might not in fact find we have under- rather than over-estimated our initial assessments; a judgement about a probability judgement may well increase rather than decrease the probability of the original judgement. And as it stands there is no reason to suppose that a succession of reiterated probability judgements need end in a probability of 0. 

  There are still two reasons to take Hume's findings here somewhat seriously, however. First, and perhaps controversially, Hume's solution to the puzzle – that our reasoning becomes too refined and strained to follow through to its conclusion – only touches the second conclusion of the argument, that concerning the extinction of belief. It does not answer the first conclusion of the argument, that knowledge degenerates into probability. Does this mean, therefore, that Hume endorses this first conclusion? Although he presents the argument “of that fantastic sect [i.e. extreme sceptics]” (Treatise 1.4.1.8, p.123) only to reinforce his positive claims concerning probable reasoning and belief, nonetheless, it seems to me at least that an endorsement of the first conclusion of the argument, which stresses the need to recognise the potential fallibility of our faculties, is entirely in keeping with Hume's mitigated scepticism, as we shall go on to discuss in the final section of this essay.  Secondly, the argument is interesting because Hume's solution to the problem it presents will, in the conclusion to the first book of the Treatise, return to create a further problem for Hume, that concerning the warrant of reason: having saved himself from radical scepticism by means of a trivial operation of the fancy, he is ultimately thrust into a “dangerous dilemma” (1.4.7.6, p.174) as to when, if ever, we should assent to reason. It is to this dilemma we shall now turn.

5. A “dangerous dilemma”

  In the conclusion to book 1 of the Treatise, Hume finds himself in something of a sceptical mire, bemoaning the “wretched condition, weakness, and disorder of the faculties” he must employ in his enquiries (Treatise 1.4.7.1 p.172), and finding himself “ready to reject all belief and reasoning”, able to “look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another” (Treatise 1.4.7.8, p.175). His enquiries have led him to conclude that the imagination is responsible for all of our beliefs, and that reason is incapable of justifying belief in the unobserved. But this gives rise to the question; given the capricious nature of the imagination, how “far ought we to yield” to its “illusions” (Treatise 1.4.7.6 p.174)? And here, Hume is presented with a dilemma. For, on the one hand,

if we assent to every trivial suggestion of the fancy; besides that these suggestions are often contrary to each other; they lead us into such errors, absurdities, and obscurities, that we must at last become asham'd of our credulity (loc cit).

But, on the other hand, if we resolve to reject every “trivial suggestion of the fancy”, we will have no response to the radical scepticism of 1.4.1, for there we were only saved by a “trivial property of the fancy, by which we enter with difficulty into remote views of things, and are not able to accompany them with so sensible an impression, as we do those, which are more easy and natural” (Treatise 1.4.7.7, p.174). Hume was only able to escape the clutches of total scepticism by arguing that the sceptical argument became too refined and difficult to follow all the way through. So if we embrace every trivial suggestion of the fancy, we soon become enmeshed in absurdity and contradiction; but if we instead reject every such suggestion, and let the understanding act alone, then it “entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life” (loc cit).

  Furthermore, following his reflections on the sceptical argument of 1.4.1, Hume briefly considers the possibility of establishing as a general maxim, “that no refin'd or elaborate reasoning is ever to be received”. But not only would this “cut off entirely all science and philosophy” (loc cit), it would also be built on a manifest contradiction, being itself the product of refined and elaborate reasoning. So the dilemma is refined:

If we embrace this principle, and condemn all refin'd reasoning, we run into the most manifest absurdities. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human understanding. We have, therefore no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all (loc cit).

It is no good suggest, as Hume initially tries, that “very refin'd reflections have little or no influence upon us” (loc cit). For as he immediately acknowledges, the refined reflections he has been considering have had a considerable effect on him, leaving him “in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron'd with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every member and faculty” (Treatise 1.4.7.8 p.175).

  Famously, Hume claims that “since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose”, his “philosophical melancholy and delirium” being abated by dinner, conversation and backgammon (Treatise 1.4.7.9 p.175). This, it must be said, is not a particularly satisfactory response, amounting to little more than a suggestion to give up and stop worrying about scepticism since it runs counter to our natures. Hume writes: “I may, nay I must yield to the currents of nature, in submitting to my senses and understanding; and in this blind submission I show most perfectly my sceptical disposition and principles” (Treatise 1.4.7.10 p.175). And in an influential interpretation, Kemp Smith argued that some beliefs were justified simply in virtue of their naturalness, such “natural beliefs” as the continued existence of objects and their being causally operative on one another being “among the facts of experience which cannot be questioned” (1941, p.124). But it is one thing for a belief to be naturally occurring; quite another for it to be justified. Belief in a deity or deities, for instance, might well be argued to be a natural belief, but this is not by itself enough to call it justified. And besides, this is still not to meet the challenge of the dilemma: how are we to steer a correct course between reason and the imagination? When should we assent to reason, and when should we follow the imagination? Hume wants to assent to some suggestions of the imagination, for instance those used in inductive inference, but not others: how to choose amongst them?

  Garrett (2015, pp. 227-237) has suggested that Hume's way out is via what he calls the Title Principle: “Where reason is lively and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it can never have any title to operate on us” (Treatise 1.4.7.11, p.176). So, since Hume does indeed have a propensity to investigate the world, and “cannot forbear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of moral good and evil, the nature and foundations of government, and the cause of those several passions and inclinations which actuate actuate and govern [him]” (Treatise 1.4.7.12 p.176), it is only proper for him to follow his imagination in this case, as his curiosity is a suitable propensity. But again, it is not clear how this curiosity is supposed to help in light of the sceptical argument given earlier, which suggested that following reason all the way (as it were) would lead to contradictions. If I'm curious about something, then I want to know the truth about it; but Hume has given no reason for thinking that following our imaginations will lead to truth, and has indeed given us reasons to suggest it won't. Furthermore, philosophy (or science) is not the only method of reasoning which is “lively and mixes itself with some propensity”, as Hume tacitly acknowledges; the same could well be said about superstition. Why should we prefer the former to the latter? Hume's answer here is to appeal to what is “safest and most agreeable”:

we ought only to deliberate concerning our choice of guide, and ought to prefer that which is safest and most agreeable. And in this respect I make bold to recommend philosophy, and shall not scruple to give it the preference to superstition of every kind or denomination (Treatise 1.4.7.13, p.176).

But, once again, given his sceptical arguments, how can Hume claim any rational ground for saying that philosophy is safer or more agreeable than superstition? He has argued that philosophy contradicts itself, and we avoid this only by our “trivial” inability to follow the reasoning. So it seems that, in the Treatise, Hume remain stuck with a genuine problem in trying to justify philosophy over what he wants to call less commendable ways of reasoning, e.g. superstition. 

  A better answer, if not one available to Hume in Treatise 1.4.7, is perhaps to be found in his distinction between the established and the trivial operations of the imagination: 

I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent, irresistible, and universal; such as the customary transition from causes to effects, and effects to causes: And the principles, which are changeable, weak and irregular; such as those I have just taken notice of [i.e. the propensity of ancient philosophers to bestow human properties on external objects] (Treatise 1.4.4.1, p.148).

This distinction arises for Hume in connection with his critique of “the ancients”, as a means of staving off the criticism that he has attacked them for excessive use of the imagination when his own system relies on it so heavily. By drawing the distinction, he is able to separate the principles of the imagination into those that “are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions”, without which “human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin”, such as inductive inference, and those that are “observ'd only to take place in weak minds, and being opposite to the other principles of custom and reasoning, may easily be subverted by a due contrast and opposition” (loc cit). Now, this move is not available to Hume in 1.4.7 (or 1.4.1), for there he stressed that it was only the trivial property of the imagination to be unable to follow excessively refined reasoning which saved us from the sceptical argument. But if we sideline what was a curious answer to a dubious argument, we have the materials for a more satisfactory answer to the question of how far we should allow ourselves to be led by the imagination. The former kinds of principle – permanent, irresistible, universal – ought to be assented to, as “by their force and settled order, arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect, they distinguish themselves from the other ideas, which are merely the offspring of the imagination” (Treatise 1.3.9.4, p.75). The latter principles meanwhile, being changeable, weak, and irregular, ought to be rejected. And so we ought to prefer philosophy, which should be grounded in the first sort of principle, over superstition, which trades in the latter. 

6. The true nature of Hume's scepticism regarding reason

  We are now, finally, in a position to pronounce on the extent and nature of Hume's scepticism regarding reason. First, it will be useful to draw a distinction between two kinds of scepticism: epistemological scepticism and doxastic scepticism. Epistemological scepticism is scepticism about knowledge: an epistemological sceptic holds that knowledge is impossible. Doxastic scepticism is scepticism about belief: a doxastic sceptic holds that no belief is more justified than any other and that we should suspend belief entirely. On the traditional interpretation of Hume as a radical sceptic, he is both an epistemological and a doxastic sceptic, who argues that knowledge is impossible and all our beliefs are without justification. But we have already seen that this is a caricature of Hume's own views, which are considerably more nuanced than his early critics allowed.

  In Section 12 of the Enquiry, 'Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy', Hume offers his own taxonomy of various kinds of scepticism, and whilst he does not explicitly categorise his own scepticism according to this division, this nonetheless remains a useful starting point in attempting to classify his own position. Firstly, he draws a distinction between scepticism antecedent to enquiry and scepticism consequent to enquiry, both of which come in an extreme and a moderate form. Extreme antecedent scepticism, most famously associated with Descartes' method of doubt, holds that no claim, including claims about the trustworthiness of our faculties, is indubitable unless it is deducible from some self-evident, indubitable, certain first principle. We must assume our claims are false until we can prove otherwise. This Hume rejects on two grounds: first, that there is no such principle, and second, that such a scepticism is self-defeating, for we cannot doubt our faculties without first using them to formulate our doubts. Cartesian doubt is thus dismissed as being impossible to maintain and inimical to enquiry. He does, however, speak more approvingly of a moderate antecedent scepticism: 

To begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately all their consequences … are the only methods, by which we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations (Enquiry 12.4, p.200).

Although it must be said that by itself this call for modesty and diligence doesn't amount to much of a scepticism at all, and Hume's own brand of scepticism is more readily associated with consequent scepticism, which differs from the antecedent variety in instead reaching conclusions about the limits of human understanding and the fallaciousness of our faculties based on experience. We should not begin by doubting our faculties, but rather should come to doubt them having observed their workings. Once again however, an extreme form of this kind of scepticism is rejected, here on the grounds that to reject the verdicts of reason or the senses entirely because of doubts about their reliability is, essentially, unliveable. An extreme sceptic who argues that we should suspend belief in, say, the existence of the external world, cannot actually live his beliefs; his scepticism is insincere.

  This latter kind of extreme consequent scepticism Hume also identifies as Pyrrhonian, in contrast to what he terms mitigated or Academic scepticism. The Pyrrhonist movement was founded some time in the first century BC, when Aenesidemus broke away from Plato's Academy, which by then had become known for a subtle brand of scepticism thanks to the influence of first Arcesilaus in the third century BC, and then Carneades a century later (Hookway 1990, p.1) This Academic scepticism, taking its inspiration from Socrates, was anti-dogmatic: instead of advancing their own theses, its proponents sought to refute claims to theoretical or philosophical knowledge by way of dialectical arguments designed to reveal the inconsistencies and contradictions in their opponents' claims to knowledge. Whilst they disputed claims to philosophical knowledge, however, they did not rule out all claims to knowledge, and they did allow for judgements of probability, even while denying they could be “comprehended or perceived”; Cicero, a later proponent of Academic scepticism, wrote that we should accept as probable what is “not grasped nor perceived nor assented to”, since if such propositions were not accepted “all life would be done away with” (Academica, cited in Wright, 2009, p.132).

By contrast, the Pyrrhonian scepticism was far more radical: it attacked not just the notion of knowledge but also belief, and argued that we ought to suspend judgement on all things. For Sextus Empricus, a late member of the school from whose work the ancient arguments survived and reached Renaissance Europe (and, directly or indirectly, subsequently Hume himself), such scepticism was defined as

an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next a state of 'unpeturbedness' or quietude.

The central principle of this scepticism consisted in “opposing to every proposition an equal proposition: for we believe that as a consequence of this we shall end by ceasing to dogmatize”. Since, the Pyrrhonist claimed, equally good arguments for and against any proposition can be made and there is therefore an equipollance or equal balance between the reasons for and against accepting such a proposition, we should therefore suspend all judgement altogether, believing no proposition to be true or false. To do otherwise is to be guilty of dogmatism.

  By our earlier classification, Pyrrhonism is a form of both epistemological and doxastic scepticism: not only is knowledge impossible but we ought to suspend all belief, neither assenting to nor denying appearances. And although Hume claims that Pyrrhonic arguments are “in the schools … difficult, if not impossible to refute” (Enquiry 12.21, p.206) (recalling his claims about the sceptical argument concerning reason in Treatise 1.4.1), and that consideration of Pyrrhonian doubts may lead naturally to his preferred mitigated scepticism in limiting the scope of “our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding” (Enquiry 12.25, p.208), he nonetheless rejects their conclusions that we should suspend all belief as being impossible, useless and downright harmful in practice: 

a PYRRHONIAN cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: Or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge any thing, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail (Enquiry 12.23, p.207).

 By contrast, Academic scepticism, which is epistemological but not doxastic – knowledge may be impossible but some beliefs are more probable and better justified than others – is praised as being “durable and useful”, correcting the “undistinguished doubts” of Pyrrhonism with a measure of “common sense and reflection”, and ensuring that we do not stray beyond “common life” in our enquiries (Enquiry 12.24-25, pp. 207-209).

  Here we reach what I believe is the true crux of Hume's scepticism regarding reason. On my reading, Hume is an epistemological sceptic – knowledge in the strict sense at least is impossible, due to the argument of Treatise 1.4.1 that sees all knowledge degenerate into probability – but he is no doxastic sceptic; some beliefs are better justified than others. Nor is he a sceptic about induction, as has already been discussed. But, he does set clear limits on what can be discovered via reason; asides from “abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number”, there is nothing we can discover independent of experience. In particular, he has in his sights what he calls “divinity” and “school metaphysics” (Enquiry 12.34, p.211); using pure reason we cannot reach conclusions about the existence of God or the nature of reality. If reason acted alone, independent of the imagination, it can only result in an extreme scepticism, as he repeatedly stresses. And the imaginative principles which underpin our reasonings are untouched by rationalist musings on metaphysics. This is not to impugn philosophy, but to recognise its proper limits:
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